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Personal  Recollections  and  Experiences 

CONCERNING    THE 

Battle  of  Stone  River. 


A  Paper  Read  by  Request  before  the  Illinois  Commandery  of  the 

Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  U.  S., 

at  Chicago,   111.,  Feb.   14,   1889. 


-BY- 


MILO    S.    HASCALL, 

OF  GOSHEN,  INDIANA, 

Formerly  a  Lieutenant  in  the  U.  S.  Army,  and  Brigadier-General 
of  Volunteers  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 


Personal  Recollections  and  Experiences 


CONCERNING    THE 


Battle  of  Stone  River. 


A  Paper  Read  by  Request  before  the  Illinois  Commandery  of  the 

Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  U.  S. , 

at  Chicago,    111.,   Feb.    14,    1889. 


-BY- 


MILO    S.    HASCALL, 

OF  GOSHEN,  INDIANA, 

Formerly  a  Lieutenant  in  the  U.  S.  Army,   and  Brigadier-General 
of  Volunteers  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 


Times  Publishing  Company, 

GOSHEN,   -  INDIANA. 

1889. 


7  7 


Personal    Recollections   and    Experiences  Concerning  the 
Battle  of   Stone   River. 


As  will  be  perceived  by  the  above  caption  to  this  paper,  it 
is  proposed  to  relate  what  happened  to  me,  and  what  I  observed 
during  the  battle  alluded  to,  and  might  not  inappropriately  be 
styled  u  What  I  know  about  the  battle  of  Stone  River." 

In  doinff  so  I  shall  not  untertake  to  "five  a  general  account 

i5  cj  O 

of  the  battle,  but  shall  confine  myself  to  that  portion  which 
came  under  my  own  observation,  and  to  necessary  inferences  as 
to  what  happened  elsewhere.  In  setting  out  it  will  be  well  to 
give  a  brief  account  of  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum. 
berland,  and  its  commanders,  so  far  as  I  know,  up  to  the  time 
of  the  memorable  battle  which  is  the  subject  of  this  paper. 
My  having  been  a  cadet  at  West  Point  from  June,  1848,  to 
June,  1852,  when  I  graduated  in  the  same  class  with  Sheridan, 
Stanly,  S  locum,  Crook,  Bonaparte  and  others,  whose  names 
have  since  become  so  distinguished,  and  my  service  in  the 
regular  army  subsequently  till  the  fall  of  1853,  threw  me  in 
contact  with,  and  was  the  means  of  my  knowing  personally, 
or  by  reputation,  most,  if  not  all  the  prominent  characters  on 
both  sides,  that  were  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  public 
by  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

This  knowledge  of  the  men  in  the  army  of  those  times 
served  me  well  all  through  the  war,  as  it  was  seldom  I  came  in 
contact  with  an  officer  on  the  other  side,  but  what  I  knew  all  his 
peculiar  characteristics,  and  idiosyncrasies.  For  illustration 
of  this  idea,  as  we  were  approaching  Atlanta,  my  division  had 
the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  the  morning  we  came  in 
sight  of  the  cit}^.  My  -advance  guard  captured  a  rebel  picket 
post,  and  one  of  the  men  captured,  had  a  morning  paper  from 


M207747 


Atlanta,  in  which  was  Johnston's  farewell  order  to  his  troops^ 
and  Hood's  order  assuming  command.  I  had  been  three  years 
at  West  Point  with  Hood,  he  having  graduated  in  1853,  in 
Schofield's  class.  I  knew  Hood  to  be  a  great,  large  hearted, 
large  sized  man,  noted  a  great  deal  more  for  his  fine  social 
and  fighting  qualities,  than  for  any  particular  scholastic  acquire 
ments,  and  inferred,  (correctly  as  the  result  showed)  that  John 
ston  had  been  removed  because  Davis,  and  his  admirers,  had 
had  enough  of  the  Fabian  policy,  and  wanted  a  man  that 
would  take  the  offensive.  I  immediately  sent  word  to  Gen. 
Sherman,  who,  with  his  staff,  was  not  far  off,  and  when  he 
came  to  the  front,  informed  him  of  the  news  I  had,  and  the 
construction  I  put  upon  it,  and  in  consequence,  an  immediate 
concentration  to  resist  an  attack  was  made  in  the  vicinity, 
where  we  were.  It  was  none  too  soon,  as  Hood,  upon  taking 
command  immediately  moved  out  to  Decatur  with  nearly  his 
entire  army,  fell  upon  McPherson's  corps,  with  the  besom  of  de 
struction,  killing  the  gallant  McPherson  early  in  the  engage 
ment,  and  with  his  vastly  superior  force,  beating  back  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  so  fast,  that  there  is  no  telling  what 
might  have  happened,  had  we  not  made  the  concentration  we 
did,  and  been  prepared  to  give  them  a  tremendous  enfilad 
ing  fire  as  soon  as  they  came  opposite  the  flanks  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio.  It  was  my  fortune  to  be  stationed 
at  Ft.  Adams,  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  as  soon  as  my  fur 
lough  expired  after  graduating  at  the  Military  Academy, 
and  there  found  Lieut.  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  (afterward  the  com 
manding  general  at  Stone  River),  and  from  being  stationed 
some  ten  months  at  the  same  post,  became  somewhat  familiarly 
acquainted  with  him  and  his  peculiarities.  I  had  never  met 
Gen.  Don  Carlos  Buel,  and  knew  but  little  of  him,  although 
he  was  a  regular  army  man,  until  the  fall  of  '61,  upon  my  re 
turn  from  service  in  West  Virginia,  during  the  first  summer 
of  the  war.  I  was  then  Colonel  of  the  17th  Indiana,  and  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  in  Nelson's  Division  of 
Buel's  Army,  which  was  then  in  and  around  Louisville,  Ky., 
and  whose  purpose  was  a  forward  move  against  Nashville. 
While  Buel's  Army,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  was 


-concentrating  in  and  about  Louisville,  preparing  for  the  for 
ward  movement,  Gov.  Morton,  of  Indiana,  was  frequently  in 
Louisville,  consulting  with  Gen.  Buel,  and  offering  suggestions 
as  to  army  movements  etc.,  and  these,  after  a  time,  came  to 
be  regarded  by  Gen.  Buel  as  meddlesome,  and  uncalled  for,  so 
much  so,  that  he  finally  intimated  to  Gov,  Morton  that  it  would 
be  as  well  for  him  to  attend  to  his  duties  as  Governor  of  In 
diana,  while  he  would  attend  to  his  as  Commanding  General 
of  the  forces  in  the  field.  It  is  important  to  mention  this  cir 
cumstance  here,  as  it  will  be  seen  further  on,  that  this  matter 
had  an  important  bearing  upon  Gen.  Bud's  subsequent  career. 
It  will  not  be  necessary,  nor  appropriate  in  this  paper,  to  enter 
into  a  detailed  account  of  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  in  its  march  upon,  and  capture  of  Nashville — in 
its  subsequent  march  to  Shiloh,  and  the  part  it  took  in  that 
most  unfortunate,  not  to  say  (in  many  respects)  disgraceful 
battle  to  our  army — in  its  subsequent  advance  upon  Corinth, 
and  its  operations  there — in  its  subsequent  march  into  northern 
Alabama  and  the  vicinity  of  Chattanooga,  and  the  forced 
march  back  to  Louisville,  made  necessary  by  Bragg' s  advance 
upon  that  city  through  the  Sequatchie  Valley,  from  Chat 
tanooga.  All  this  is  known  to  the  public,  and  the  public  has 
arrived  at  its  own  conclusions  as  to  the  merits  or  demerits 
of  these  various  operations.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say-, 
however,  that  those  of  us  who  accompanied  Gen.  Buel  in  this 
remarkable  march  and  counter-march,  and  particularly  these 
who  had  important  commands  during  the  same,  had  ample 
opportunity  to  arrive  at  intelligent  conclusions  as  to  the  mer 
its  and  demerits  of  the  man.  It  may  be  inferred  from  what 
has  already  been  said  that.  Gen.  Buel  was  not  particularly 
popular  with  political  soldiers,  newspaper  correspondents,  and 
others  who  were  carrying  on  the  war  from  safe  distances  in 
the  rear.  He  was  eminently  and  emphatically  a  soldier,  with 
no  ambition  or  expectations  outside  the  line  of  his  duty,  and 
with  honor  and  integrity  so  entirely  above  suspicion,  that  the 
camp  follower  and  money  getter  did  not  presume  to  even  en 
ter  into  his  presence.  Notwithstanding  all  this,  by  the  time 
of  the  return  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  Louisville. 


though  that  army  had  then  performed  services  that  justly  en 
titled  it  to  the  lasting  gratitude  of  the  country,  and  notwith 
standing  its  eminent  commander  enjoyed,  so  far  as  I  knew,  the 
entire  confidence  of  the  officers  and  men  in  regard  to  his  loy 
alty,  patriotism  and  ability,  yet  there  had  sprung  up  a  fire  in 
the  rear  party  that  was  constantly  impugning  his  loyalty,  his 
ability,  and  his  fitness  to  command,  and  demanding  his  re 
moval.  In  the  -light  of  what  has  already  been  said,  it  can  now 
be  seen  whence,  and  from  what  source  this  hue  and  cry  pro 
ceeded. 

On  account  of  a  contemporaneous  popularity  that  Gen. 
Rosecrans  had  achieved  about  that  time,  at  the  battle  of  luka, 
there  arose  a  demand  in  the  press  that  Gen.  Buel  be  super 
seded  in  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  by  that 
officer.  As  I  have  said,  my  acquaintance  with  Gen.  Rosecrans 
previous  to  his  assuming  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  had  been  confined  to  the  ten  months  I  had  been  sta 
tioned  with  him  at  Newport,  R.  I.,  in  '52-3. 

My  recollections  of  him  were  not  such  as  to  inspire  me 
with  confidence  in  him  as  the  proper  person  to  be  placed  in 
command  of  an  army.  At  that  time  he  seemed  to  be  a  great 
enthusiast  in  regard  to  the  Catholic  Church  ;  seemed  to  want 
to  think  of  nothing  else,  talk  of  nothing  else,  and  in  fact  do 
nothing  else,  except  to  proselyte  for  it  and  attend  upon  its 
ministrations.  No  night  Avas  ever  so  dark  and  tempestuous, 
that  he  would  not  brave  the  boisterous  seas  of  Newport  Harbor 
to  attend  mass,  and  no  occasion,  however  inappropriate,  was 
ever  lost  sight  of  to  advocate  its  cause  ;  in  fact,  he  was  what 
would  nowadays  be  called  most  emphatically  a  crank  on  that 
subject,  and  might  not  inappropriately  be  considered  a  one- 
ideaed  man  lacking  in  the  breadth  and  poise,  so  necessary  to 
success  in  the  commander  of  an  army  in  the  field.  While 
Buel's  Army  Avas  in  Louisville  getting  reinforcements  and 
preparing  to  renew  operations  against  Bragg,  I  obtained  a  feAv 
days  leave  of  absence  and  had  no  end  of  inquiries  on  my  Avay 
home  and  after  arriving  there,  as  to  Avhat  I  thought  of  the 
propriety  and  necessity  of  relieving  Buel.  1  uninformly  re 
plied  that  as  far  as  the  Army  Avas  concerned  there  Avas  not  that 


I  kneAv  of,  any  want  of  confidence  in  Duel,  but  on  the  other 
hand,  nothing  but  the  most  sincere  confidence  and  respect. 
That  the  only  reason  that  could  be  assigned  was  the  want  of 
confidence  that  the  fire  in  the  rear  might  have  caused  in 
the  country  at  large,  and  that  even  if  this  was  thought  to  bo 
necessary,  it  would  be  very  bad  policy  to  substitute  Kosecrans 
in  his  stead.  How  near  correct  I  was  in  this  estimate  the 
public  is  now  prepared  to  judge.  Of  course  the  possibility 
of  BueFs  removal  dispirited  him,  and  perhaps  inspired  some 
of  the  officers  under  him,  that  might  by  possibility  be  selected 
to  succeed  him,  with  a  desire  that  such  might  be  the  case.  At 
all  events,  shortly  after  the  arm}-  again  took  the  offensive, 
the  notorious  and  disastrous  affair  at  Perry  ville  took  place,  in 
regard  to  which  it  was  charged  at  the  time  by  Gsn.  Buel,  arid 
believed  by  others,  that  it  was  brought  on  by  Gen.  A.  McD. 
McCook  separating  himself  more  from  the  body  of  the  army 
than  his  orders  justified,  and  beyond  supporting  distance,  in 
order  that  an  engagement  might  be  brought  on,  in  which,  if 
successful,  ho  might  claim  the  sole  credit,  and  thereby  super 
sede  Buel  in  command.  However  this  may  be,  this  engage 
ment  was  the  culminating  affair  in  BueFs  career.  The  blame 
was  (as  I  think)  unjustly  attached  to  him, and  he  was  relieved  of 
his  command,  and  Gen.  W.  S.  Rosecrans  appointed  in  his 
place.  After  this  battle,  the  Army  resumed  offensive  oper 
ations  against  Bragg  and  in  due  time  arrived  in  Nashville, 
\vhen  offensive  operations  were  for  a  time  suspended,  in  order 
to  get  supplies  forward,  and  put  the  army  in  shape  for  active, 
and  if  possible,  decisive  operations.  During  the  weeks  that 
we  thus  la}'  encamped  about  Nashville  I  had  frequent  oppor 
tunities  to  see  Gen.  Kosecrans  and  observe  his  manner,  char 
acteristics  and  surroundings  and  had  hoped  to  be  enabled  to 
form  a  more  favorable  opinion  of  the  man  and  his  fitness  for 
the  high  position  to  which  he  had  been  called  than  I  had  there 
tofore  entertained.  I  was  sorry,  however,  to  be  forced  to  the 
conclusion  that  my  estimate  of  the  man  had  been  even  more 
favorable  than  the  facts  would  justify.  His  head  seemed  to 
have  been  completely  turned  by  the  greatness  of  his  promo 
tion.  Instead  of  the  quiet  dignity,  orderly  and  biiMness 


methods  that  had  formerly  obtained  at  the  headquarters  of 
the  Army,  the  very  reverse  seemed  to  be  the  rule. 

Having  by  this  time  surrounded  himself,  in  addition  to 
the  usual  staff  and  appliances  ordinarily  to  be  found  at  the 
headquarters  of  an  army  in  the  field,  with  a  numerous  coterie 
of  newspaper  correspondents,  and  Catholic  priests,  who  seemed 
in  his  estimation  to  be  vastly  more  important  than  anyone  else 
about  him,  and  laid  in  a  good  supply  of  crucifixes,  holy  water, 
spiriting  frumenti,  Chinese  gongs,  flambeaux,  jobbing  presses, 
printers'  devils,  javelins,  white  elephants,  and  other  cabalistic 
emblems  and  evidences  that  a  holy  crusade  was  about  to  bo 
entered  upon,  and  having  daily  announced  through  his 
various  newspaper  correspondents,  jobbing  presses,  and 
other  means  of  reaching  the  public  and  the  Confederate 
Army  lying  immediately  in  our  front,  exactly  what  was 
going  on,  one  could  but  wonder  at  the  sublime  indifference 
of  Bragg,  and  his  Army  remaining  in  the  State  of  Tennessee,  in 
the  midst  of  preparations  for  their  destruction  such  as  these. 
As  this  magnificent  and  resplendent  cavalcade  of  Holy, 
Oriental,  and  gorgeous  splendor  moved  about  from  camp 
to  camp  during  the  weeks  that  we  lay  at  Nashville  making 
these  gigantic  and  awe-inspiring  preparations  for  the 
advance,  every  knee  was  bowed,  and  every  tongue  confessed, 
that  Allah  was  great,  and  thrice  illustriously  great  was  this 
Savior  that  had  been  sent  to  us.  All  things  though,  however 
grand  and  glorious,  must  have  an  end,  and  it  was  finally  an 
nounced  during  the  last  days  of  December,  1862,  that  the  army 
was  ready  for  a  forward  move.  You  will  not  be  surprised  to  be 
informed  after  what  has  preceded,  that  it  was  my  opinion  that 
the  Catholic  officers  having  command  in  that  army  would  fare 
well  when  the  honors  of  the  campaign  came  to  be  distributed. 
Accordingly,  I  made  a  prediction  in  writing  that  every  one 
of  these,  consisting  of  Brig. -Gen.  Philip  H.  Sheridan,  Brig.- 
Gen.  D.  S.  Stanly,  Brig. -Gen.  James  S.  Negley,  and  C/apt. 
James  St.  Claire  Morton,  would  all  be  promoted  entirely  re 
gardless  of  what  the  fortunes  of  war  might  have  in  store  for 
them.  This  I  did  without  the  slightest  feeling  of  unkindness 
or  jealousy  towards  these  officers,  but  simply  on  account  of 


my  belief  that  the  Commanding  General  was  such  a  narrow- 
minded  bigot  in  regard  to  Catholicism,  that  it  was  impossible 
for  him  not  to  allow  considerations  of  this  kind  to  control  his 
estimate  of  men.  We  shall  see  how  nearly  correct  I  was  in 
this  estimate  further  on.  At  the  time  this  campaign  was 
entered  upon  the  National  Forces  had  not  been  divided  into 
Army  Corps  and  numbered.  Each  Army  commander  divided 
his  army  as  to  him  seemed  best.  Rosecrans  divided  his  into 
three  grand  divisions  called  the  Right,  Center,  and  Left,  and 
each  of  these  into  three  ordinary  divisions  of  four  brigades 
each,  the  Right,  Center  and  Left  commanded  respectively 
by  Generals  A.  McD.  McCook,  George  H.  Thomas  and  Thos. 
L.  Crittenden. 

At  the  time  of  this  advance  and  for  a  long  time  previous 
thereto,  I  was  commanding  a  brigade  in  Gen.  Thos.  J.  Wood's 
division  of  the  left  wing.  The  advance  movement  all  along 
the  line  finally  commenced  about  the  26th  day  of  December, 
18f»2.  The  first  day  Palmer's  division  of  the  left  wing  had 
the  advance  and  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  had  reached  the 
vicinity  of  Lavergne,  having  had  some  pretty  sharp  skir 
mishing  in  so  doing.  The  next  day  by  rotation  Wood's 
division  had  the  advance. 

It  was  not  the  place  of  my  brigade  to  lead  the  division 
that  day,  but  I  was  specially  requested  to  take  the  advance, 
however,  as  the  progress  made  the  day  before  had  not  been 
satisfactory.  I  consented  to  do  so  upon  condition  that  the 
cavalry,  which  had  been  in  advance  the  day  before  should  be 
retired  to  the  rear  of  my  brigade  ready  to  be  brought  into  use 
should  we  succeed  in  routing  the  enemy,  and  should  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  country  admit  of  the  successful  use  of  cavalry. 
I  had  seen  so  many  disastrous  results  ensue  from  the  use  of 
squadrons  of  cavalry  in  advance  of  an  army  under  such  cir 
cumstances  as  we  were  advancing,  that  I  did  not  want  to  run 
any  such  risks  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  and  inevitable  risks 
of  such  advances  against  an  army  in  the  field.  The  cavalry 
necessarily  has  to  retire  before  any  effective  work  can  be  done, 
and  usually  comes  back  pell  mell  with  a  lot  of  riderless  horses, 
and  creates  infinitely  more  confusion,  consternation,  and  even 


8 

danger  to  the  advancing  army,  than  anything  the  enemy  would 
be  likely  to  do  at  that  stage  of  the  operations. 

Having  thus  arrived  at  the  front  and  got  the  cavalry  out 
of  the  way  to  the  rear,  I  found  the  enemy  securely  lodged  in 
the  town  of  Lavergne,and  masked  from  our  view  by  the  build 
ings,  shrubbery  and  fences.  My  orders  contemplated  an  im 
mediate  advance  along  the  main  pike  toward  Murfreesboro. 
Thus  no  opportunity  was  given  for  flanking  them,  and  so 
compelling  them  to  abandon  the  town.  The  country  was  open 
between  my  command  and  the  town,  and  afforded  no  shelter 
whatever  for  the  troops.  I  formed  the  brigade  in  two  lines 
about  200  yards  apart,  with  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  about 
the  same  distance  in  advance  of  the  first  line,  with  a  section  of 
artillery  in  the  interval  between  the  infantry  lines.  As  these 
dispositions  were  about  completed  preparatory  to  ordering  an 
advance  of  the  line  a  heavy  infantry  fire  was  opened  upon  us 
from  the  buildings  and  cover  the  town  afforded  to  the  enemy, 
and  their  tire  was  taking  effect  even  upon  the  first  line  of  in 
fantry  back  of  the  skirmish  line.  At  this  juncture  I  ordered 
the  infantry  to  lie  down,  the  artillery  to  open  with  shot  and 
shell  upon  the  town,  and  the  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  to  fix 
bayonets  and  on  double  quick  to  make  the  distance  between 
them  and  the  town;  to  be  immediately  followed  by  the  main 
lines  of  infantry  as  soon  as  the  skirmishers  had  reached  the 
town.  This  movement  was  entirely  successful;  we  soon  had 
routed  the  enemy  from  tne  town,  -but  had  left  some  forty  or 
fifty  dead  comrades  behind  us  to  be  cared  for  by  those  in  our 
rear. 

As  soon  as  we  had  driven  the  enemy  beyond  the  town,  we 
continued  the  same  order  with  two  regiments  in  line  of  battle 
about  200  yards  apart  to  the  left  of  the  main  pike,  and  two  to 
the  right  in  like  manner,  all  preceded  by  a  heavy  line  of 
skirmishers,  and  pushed  forward  with  all  possible  dispatch. 
A  heavy  rain  set  in  about  the  time  we  commenced  the  advance 
beyond  the  town,  which  continued  all  day,  so  the  corn-fields 
and  other  plowed  fields  soon  became  ankle  deep  with  mud. 
Nevertheless  we  pressed  forward  continuously.  If  we  encoun 
tered  the  enemy  in  any  considerable  force,  the  skirmish  line 


9 

gradually  slackened  their  progress  until  the  main  line  came  up 
with  them.  Artillery  was  brought  forward  and  fired  advancing 
along  the  road.  In  this  manner  we  kept  up  an  almost  con 
tinuous  advance,  our  dead  and  wounded  being  cared  for  by 
those  in  our  rear.  By  night-fall  we  had  made  an  advance  of 
nearly  eight  miles,  to  Stewart's  Creek.  As  we  approached 
Stewart's  Creek  we  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  set  the 
bridge  over  the  same  on  fire.  I  immediately  concentrated  four 
pieces  of  artilllery  on  a  little  eminence  to  the  right  of  the  road, 
and  commenced  shelling  the  enemy  beyond  the  creek.  Under 
the  cover  of  this  fire  the  infantry  was  ordered  forward  at 
double  quick,  and  succeeded  in  subduing  the  flames  before 
sufficient  damage  had  been  done  to  prevent  the  use  of  the 
bridge  by  our  army.  So  rapid  had  been  our  advance  that 
three  companies  of  rebel  cavalry  that  had  been  hovering  on 
our  left  flank  during  the  advance,  were  cut  off  before  they 
reached  the  bridge,  and  were  captured  by  us  with  all  their 
horses  and  accoutrements.  In  the  evening  we  were  congratu 
lated  by  all  our  superior  officers  for  having  accomplished  a  very 
satisfactory  day's  work. 

This  brought  us  up  to  the  evening  of  the  27th  of  Decem 
ber.  During  tne  time  between  this  and  the  afternoon  of  the 
30th  of  the  same  month,  all  portions  of  our  army  had  pressed 
forward  along  the  different  lines  of  march  laid  out  for  them, 
encountering  the  usual  incidents  of  driving  in  the  enemy's 
cavalry  and  outposts,  until  finally  at  that  time  our  entire  army 
had  arrived  along  the  left  bank  of  Stone  River,  opposite  the 
city  of  Murfreesboro,  some  two  or  three  miles  further  on. 
Here  we  encountered  the  enemy  in  force  and  their  fortifica 
tions  were  plainly  visible  all  along  opposite  us  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river,  between  it  and  the  city  of  Murfreesboro,  and 
here  it  was  very  evident  Bragg  intended  to  make  his  stand 
and  accept  the  guage  of  battle. 

There  was  desultory  firing  all  along  the  line  during 
that  memorable  afternoon,  but  during  that  time  our  army  was 
finally  concentrated,  McCook,  with  his  three  divisions  on  the 
right,  Thomas,  with  his  three  in  the  center,  and  Crittenden, 


10 

with  his  three  on  the  left.  The  whole  line,  with  the  intervals 
for  artillery  and  cavalry,  occupying  a  distance  of  two  or  three 
miles,  more  or  less.  Crittenden's  three  divisions  were  formed, 
two  divisions  in  line  of  battle,  and  one  in  reserve,  as  follows  : 
Palmer's  division  on  the  right,  Wood's  on  the  left,  and  Van 
Cleve  in  reserve  opposite  the  interval  between  Palmer's  and 
Wood's,  and  each  division  consisting  likewise  of  three  brigades, 
were  formed  in  like  manner,  two  in  line  and  one  in  reserve.  In 
Wood's  division  W  agner's  brigade  was  on  the  right, my  own  on 
the  left,  and  Marker  in  reserve.  This  arrangement  brought  my 
brigade  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  entire  army.  During  that 
evening  we  were  made  acquainted  with  the  plan  of  the  attack 
which  was  to  be  made  by  our  army  under  cover  of  the  gray  of 
the  morning  the  following  day,  the  memorable  31st  day  of 
December,  1 862.  This  was  for  the  left  wing  (Crittenden's) 
to  cross  Stone  River  —  which  was  at  that  time  fordable  at  all 
points  for  all  arms  of  the  service  —  and  deliver  a  furious 
attack  on  the  enemy's  extreme  right,  this  to  be  followed  up  by 
a  wheel  to  the  right  by  other  portions  of  our  army  in  case 
Crittenden  was  successful  in  his  attack,  until  all  portions  of 
our  army  should  become  engaged  and  the  battle  become  gen 
eral  all  along  the  line. 

This  plan  was  well  conceived,  and  might  have  worked 
well  enough  perhaps,  if  the  enemy  had  waited  for  us.  The 
same  mistake  (or  a  similar  one  rather)  was  made  here  that 
was  made  by  Grant  at  Shiloh,  only  the  latter  was  much  more 
faulty,  In  that  case  Grant  was  moving  his  army  up  the 
Tennessee  River  to  Savannah,  the  object  being  to  attack 
Beauregard,  then  at  Corinth,  some  twenty  miles  from  Savan 
nah,  as  soon  as  he  should  have  made  a  junction  with  Buel's 
army,  then  at  Nashville,  Tenn.,  and  which  was  to  march  from 
that  place  to  Savannah.  Grant's  army  proceeding  by  boats,  ar 
rived  at  Savannah  by  detachments  first,  and  should  have 
all  been  landed  on  the  side  of  the  river  toward  Grant's  rein 
forcements,  instead  of  on  the  side  toward  the  enemy — unless 
he  considered  from  the  time  he  landed,  anything  more  than  a 
picket  force  of  cavalry  to  keep  him  advised  of  the  enemy's 
movements  on  the  side  toward  them — that  he  had  enough  to  sue- 


11 

cessfully  cope  with  him.  If  he  thought  the  latter, he  should  have 
been  with  his  troops  on  the  side  of  the  river  toward  the  enemy 
instead  of  eight  miles  below  on  the  other  side.  Thus  the  most 
elementary  principles  of  grand  tactics  and  military  science,  that, 
in  case  two  armies  are  endeavoring  to  concentrate  with  a  view 
of  delivering  an  attack  on  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy,  the 
inferior  force  nearest  the  enemy,  should  be  careful  to  oppose 
all   natural  obstructions,   such  as   rivers,   mountains,  heavy 
forests,    impassable    marshes,    between  it    and    the  enemy 
until, a  junction  can  be  made.     In  this  case  the  detachments  of 
Grant's  army  were  allowed  to  land  on  the  side  toward  the 
enemy,  select  their  locations  as  best  they  could  without  instruc 
tions  or  concert  of  action  of  any  kind,  and  this  within  fifteen 
to  eighteen  miles  of  the  enemy  in  force,  in  the  enemy's  coun 
try,  where  it  wTas  known  to  all  that  he  had  daily    and  hourly 
opportunity  from  the  citizens  who  fell  back  before  our  forces, 
to  find  out  all  the  time  the  exact  locations  and  strength  of 
Grant's  and  Bud's  armies,  respectively.     Under  circumstances 
like  these,  the  merest  tyro  in  military   knowedge  ought  to 
have  known  that  an  experienced,  able  officer,   such  as  Beau- 
regard.  was  known  to  be,  would  not  wait  for  the  concentration, 
before  anticipating  the  attack.     So  it  was  no  surprise  to  any 
one  except  the  troops  on  that  side  the  river  towards  Corinth, 
and  possibly  to  Grant,   then  at  Savannah,   that  on  that  fatal 
Sunday  morning  in  April,  1862,  when  Grant  had  got  sufficient 
troops  on  that  side  of  the  river  to  make  it  an  object  for  Beau- 
regard  to  destroy  or  capture  them,  and  wrhen  Buel's  advance 
had  approached  within  twenty  to  twenty-five  miles  of  Savan 
nah,  that  Beauregard  determined  upon  an  attack,  and  declared 
he  would  crush  or  capture  the  troops  on  that  side,  and  water 
his  horse  in  the  Tennessee  river  that  night,  and  that  but  for 
the  timely  arrival  by  forced  marches  of, Buel's   advance   of 
two  divisions  on  the  field  about  four  o'clock  that  afternoon,  he 
would  undoubtedly  have  executed  his  purpose.     If  Buel  had 
been  guilty  of  such  blundering  (not  to  call  it  by  any  worse 
name  than  this)  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  make  the 
country  at  the  North  believe  that  he  did  not  meditate  its  de 
struction.     For  this  blunder  Grant  was  promptly  relieved  of 


12 

,his  command,  by  the  proper  authorities,  and  ft  was  many 
years  afterwards,  before  any  one  was  found,  who  did  not  think 
this  was  very  moderate  punishment,  under  such  circumstances. 
The  fault  in  the  case  under  consideration  differs  in  kind,  but 
not  in  its  disastrous  effects  upon  our  cause  and  our  army. 

The  right  of  our  army  at  Murfreesboro,  judging  from 
what  happened  (and  as  I  said  at  the  outset,  when  I  don't  know 
personally  what  happened,  I  speak  from  necessary  inference) 
seemed  to  think  that  inasmuch  as  our  plan  of  battle  contem 
plated  an  attack  by  the  extreme  left,  to  be  followed  up  by 
them  subsequently  during  the  day,  that  they  had  nothing  to 
do  at  that  early  hour  in  the  morning,  but  to  keep  a  picket 
force  out,  send  their  artillery  horses  to  a  distant  point  for 
water,  stack  their  arms,  and  get  breakfast.  They  did  not 
seem  to  think  possibly  Bragg  might  have  plans  of  his  ownr 
and  that  our  attack  might  be  anticipated,  and  that  our  right 
might  receive  a  desperate  attack  while  our  left  was  preparing 
to  deliver  one.  This,  as  you  all  know,  was  what  happened^ 
and  you  all  know  its  disastrous  results. 

Current  reports  at  the  time  were  to  the  effect  that  the 
right  was  found  when  the  attack  came  upon  them  in  the  con 
dition  already  described,  and  the  prompt  manner  in  which  they 
were  hurled  from  the  field,  corroborates  this  view  of  the  case. 
This,  of  course,  caused  the  troops  to  their  left  to  be  imme 
diately  out-flanked,  and  no  resistance,  to  amount  to  anything, 
from  that  portion  of  our  line  could  be  expected  under  such 
circumstances.  How  much  Gen.  Rosecrans  and  his  staff  are 
properly  to  blame  for  the  state  of  things  existing  on  the  right 
at  the  time  of  the  attack,  I  have  no  means  of  knowing,  and  do 
not  undertake  to  say  but  that  it  was  the  prime  cause  of  the 
very  serious  disaster  to  our  arms,  and  to  the  prestige  of  our 
army  that  happened  at  that  battle,  there  can  be  no  doubt  or 
chance  for  two  opinions.  How  the  battle  raged,  and  what 
happened,  so  far  as  I  then  knew,  I  cannot  better  describe  than  by 
extracting  from  my  official  report  of  that  day's  proceedings, 
made  on  the  6th  of  January,  following,  and  which  I  do  as 
follows: 


13 

HEADQUARTERS  1st  BRIGADE,  IST  DIV'N,  LEFT  WING,  NEAR 
MURFREESBORO',  Term.,  Jan.  6,  1863. 

Capt.  M.  P.  Bestow,  A.  A,  A.  G.: 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the  oper 
ations  of  my  brigade,  (formerly  the  15th  Brigade,  6th   Division,   but 
under  the  new  nomenclature,  1st  Brigade,  1st  Division,  left  wing) 
on  the  eventful  31st  of  December,  1862. — During  the  night  of  the 
30th  I  had  received  notice  through  Gen.   Wood,   our   division   com 
mander,  that  the  left  wing,  Crittenden's  corps,  would  cross   Stone 
river  and  attack  the  enemy  on  their  right.     My  brigade  was  posted 
on  the  extreme  left  of  our  entire  line  of  battle  and  was  guarding  and 
overlooking  the  ford  over  which  we  were  to  cross.     On  the  morning 
of  the  31st  heavy  firing  was  heard  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  line, 
(McCook's  corps)  but  as  they  had  been  fighting   their   way   all  the 
distance  from  Nolensville  as  we  had  from  Lavergne,  no  particular 
importance  was  attached  to  this,  and  I  was  getting  my  brigade  into 
position,  ready  to  cross  as  soon  as  Gen.  Van  Cleve's  division,  which 
was  then  crossing,  was  over.     All  this  time  the  firing  on  the  right 
became  heavier,  and  apparently  nearer  to  us,  and  our  fears  began  to 
be  aroused  that  the  right  wing  was  being  rapidly  driven  back  upon 
us.     At  this  juncture  Gen.  Van  Cleve  halted  his   division   and  the 
most  terrible  state  of  suspense  pervaded  the  entire  line,  as  it  became 
more  and  more  evident  that  the  right  was  being  driven  rapidly  back 
upon  us.     On  and  on  they  came  till  the  heaviest  fire  was   getting 
nearly  around  to  the  pike  leading  to  Nashville,  when  General  Rose- 
crans  appeared  in  person,  and  ordered  me  to  go  with  my  brigade  at 
once  to  the  support  of  the  right,  pointing  toward  our  rear,  where  the 
heaviest  fire  was  raging.     Gen.  Van  Cleve's  division  and  Col.  Hark- 
er's  brigade  of  our   division   received   the  same   order.     I   at  once 
changed  the  front  of  my  brigade  to  the  rear,  preparatory  to  starting 
in  the  same  direction,  but  had  not  proceeded  more  than  200  yards 
in  the  new  direction  before  the  fugitives  from  the  right  became  so 
numerous,  and  the  fleeing  mule-teams  and  horsemen  so  thick,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  me  to  go  forward  with  my  command  without 
its  becoming  a  confused  mass.     I  therefore  halted,  and  awaited  de- 
velopements.    Gen.  Van  Cleve  and  Col.  Harker  not  meeting  with  so 
much  opposition  pressed  forward  and  got  into  position  beyond  the 
railroad,  ready  to  open  on  the  enemy   as  soon  as  our  fugitives  were 
out  of  the  way.     They  soon  opened   fire,  joined  by   some   batteries 
and  troops  belonging  to  the  center  (Gen.  Thomas'   corps)  and  Es- 
tep's  battery  of  my  brigade,  and  after  about  an  hours'  fighting  along 
this  new  line,  during  which  time  I  was  moving  my  command  from 
point  to  point,  ready  to  support  any  troops  that  most  needed  it.   The 


14 

onslaught  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  in  a  great  measure  checked^ 
and  we  had  reasonable  probability  of  maintaing  this  line.  During 
all  this  time  my  men  were  exposed  to  a  severe  fire  of  shot  and  shell 
from  a  battery  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  and  several  men  were 
killed.  About  this  time  an  aid  of  Gen.  Palmer's  came  galloping  up 
to  me,  and  said  that  unless  he  could  be  supported  his  division  would 
give  way.  Palmer's  division  formed  the  right  of  Gen.  Crittenden's 
line  of  battle  on  the  morning  of  the  31st.  After  consulting  with 
Gen.  Wood  he  ordered  me  to  send  a  regiment  to  support  Gen.  Pal 
mer.  Accordingly  I  sent  the  3d  Kentucky  regiment,  commanded 
by  Lieut.  Col.  Sam7!  McKee.  Before  the  regiment  had  been  ten 
minutes  in  its  new  position,  Capt.  Kerstetter,  my  Adjutant  Generalr 
reported  to  me  that  Col.  McKee  had  been  ki  led  and  the  regiment 
badly  cut  up.  I  therefore  moved  with  the  other  three  regiments  of 
my  command  to  their  relief.  The  line  they  were  trying  to  hold  was 
that  port  of  our  original  line  of  battle  lying  immediately  to  the  right 
of  the  railroad,  and  forming  an  acute  angle  with  the  same.  This 
portion  of  our  original  line,  about  two  regimental  fronts,  together 
with  two  fronts  to  the  left  held  by  Colonel  Wagner's  brigade,  was  all 
of  our  original  line  of  battle  but  what  our  troops  had  been  driven 
from ;  and  if  they  succeeded  in  carrying  this  they  would  have 
turned  our  left,  and  a  total  route  of  our  forces  could  not  then  have 
been  avoided.  Seeing  the  importance  of  the  position,  I  told  my  men 
that  it  must  be  held  even  if  it  cost  the  last  man  we  had.  I  imme 
diately  sent  in  the  26th  Ohio,  commanded  by  the  gallant  M  ijor  Wm. 
H.  Squires,  to  take  position  on  the  right  of  the  3d  Kentucky,  and 
support  it,  and  dispatched  an  aid  for  the  18th  Indiana  battery  to 
come  to  this  point  and  open  on  the  enemy.  No  sooner  had  the  26th 
Ohio  got  in  position  than  they  became  hotly  engaged,  and  the  nu 
merous  dead  and  wounded  that  were  immediately  brought  to  the 
rear  told  how  desperate  was  the  contest.  The  gallent"  Lieut.  Mc- 
Clellan  of  that  regiment  was  brought  to  the  rear  mortally  wounded, 
and  expired  by  my  side  in  less  than  five  minutes  from  the  time  the 
regiment  took  position.  Still  the  fight  went  on,  and  still  brave  men 
went  down.  The  3d  Kentucky,  now  reduced  to  less  than  one-half  its 
original  number,  with  ten  officers  out  of  its  founeen  remaining  ones, 
badly  wounded,  was  still  bravely  at  work.  In  less  than  ten  minutes 
after  the  fall  of  Lieut.  Col.  McKee,  the  gallant  Major  Daniel  R. 
Collier,  of  that  regiment,  received  two  severe  wounds,  one  in  the  leg 
and  one  in  the  breast.  Adjutant  Bullitt  had  his  horse  shot  from  un 
der  him,  but  nothing  could  induce  either  of  them  to  leave  the  field. 
Equally  conspicuous  and  meritorious  was  the  conduct  of  Major 
Squires  and  Adjutant  Franklin,  of  the  26th  Ohio.  Major  Squires' 
horse  was  three  times  shot  through  the  neck ;  nevertheless,  he  and 


15 

all  his  officers  stood  by  throughout  and  most  gallantly  sustained  and 
encouraged  their  men. 

Estep's  battery  came  up  in  due  time,  and  taking  a  position  on  a 
little  rise  of  ground  in  the  rear  of  the  26th  Ohio,  and  3d  Kentucky, 
opened  a  terrific  fire  of  shot  and  shell  over  the  heads  of  our  infantry. 
About  one  hour  aftor  the  26th  Ohio  got  into  position,  this  terrible 
attack  of  the  enemy  was   repulsed,  and  they   drew  back   into   the 
woods,  and  under  cover  of  an  intervening  hill,  to  reform  their  shat 
tered  columns  and  renew  the  attack.     I  now  took  a  survey  of   the 
situation,  and  found  that  along  the  entire  line  to  the  right  and  left 
of  the  railroad,  which  had  not  yet  been  carried  by  the  enemy,  I  was 
the  only  general  officer  present,  and  was  therefore  in  command,  and 
responsible  for  the  conduct  of    affairs.     CoL  Hazen,  commanding  a 
brigade  in  Gen.  Palmer's  division,  was  present  with  his  brigade  to  the 
left  of  the  railroad.     Col.  Gross,  commanding  another  brigade  in  the 
same  division,  was  also  present  with  what  there  was  left  of  his  bri 
gade,  and  most  nobly  did  he  co-operate  with  me,  with  the  6th  and 
25th  Ohio  to  the  right  of  the  railroad,  while  Col.  Wagner,  command 
ing  the  2d  brigade,  1st  division,  (left  wing)  nobly  sustained  his  front, 
assisted  by  CoL  Hazen  to  the  left  of  the  railroad.     I  now  relieved  the 
3d  Kentucky  regiment,  who  were  nearly  annihilated,  and  out  of  am 
munition,  with  the  58th  Indiana  regiment  of  my  brigade,  commanded 
by  Col.  Geo.  P.  Buell ;  and  this  being  a  much  larger  regiment  than 
the  3d  Kentucky,  filled  up  the  entire  space  from  where  the  right  of 
the  3d  Kentucky  rested,  to  the  railroad.     I  then  threw  forward  the 
right  of  the  6th  Ohio  regiment  of  Col.  Gross'  brigade,  which  was  on 
the  right  of  the  26th  Ohio,  so  that  its  line  of  battle  was  more  nearly 
perpendicular  to  the  railroad,  and  so  its  fire   would  sweep  the  front 
of  the  26th  Ohio,  and  58th  Indiana,  and  supported  the  6th  Ohio  with 
Estep's  battery  on  a  little  eminence  to  its  right,  and  brought  the 
97th    Ohio,    Col.   Lane,    from    Wagner's    brigade,    to    still    further 
strengthen  the  right.     These  dispositions  being  made,  I  galloped  a 
little  to  the  rear,  and  found  Gen.  Rosecrans,  and  called  his  attention 
to  the  importance  of  the  position  I  was  holding,  and  the  necessity  of 
keeping  it  well  supported.     He  rode  to  the  front  with  me,  approved 
of  the  dispositions  1  had  made,  spoke  a  few  words  of  encouragement 
to  the  men,  cautioning  them  to  hold  their  fire  until  the  enemy  had 
got  well  up,  and  had  no  sooner  retired  than  the  enemy  emerged  from 
the  woods  over  the  hill,  and  were  moving  upon  us  again  in  splendid 
style,  and  in  great  force.— As  soon  as  they  came  in  sight,  the  6th 
and  26th  Ohio,  and  Estep's  battery  opened  on  them,  and  did  splen 
did  execution  ;  but  on  they  came,  until  within  IOC  yards  of  our  line, 
when  Col.  Buell,  of  the  58th  Indiana,  who  had  lost  three  men,  but 


16 

had  not  fired  a  gun,  ordered  his  men  to  fire.  The  effect  was  indis- 
cribable  ;  the  enemy  fell  in  winrows,  and  went  staggering  back  from 
the  effects  of  this  unexpected  volley.  Soon,  however,  they  came  up 
again  and  assaulted  us  furiously  for  about  one  and  a  half  hours,  but 
the  men  all  stood  their  ground  nobly,  and  at  the  end  of  that  time 
compelled  the  enemy  to  retire  as  before. 

During  the  heat  of  this  attack  a  heavy  cross  fire  was  brought  to 
bear  on  the  position  I  occupied,  and  Corporal  Frank  Mayer,  of  the 
3d  Ohio  Volunteer  Cavalry,  in  command  of  my  escort,  was  shot 
through  the  leg,  and  my  Adjt.  General,  Capt.  Ed.  R.  Kerstetter,  was 
shot  through  his  coat,  grazing  his  back.  The  regiments  all  behaved 
splendidly  again,  and  the  58th  Indiana  won  immortal  honors.  Lieut. 
Blackford,  of  that  regiment,  was  shot  dead,  and  several  of  the  officers, 
including  Capts.  Downey  and  Alexander,  badly  wounded.  Estep's 
battery  was  compelled  to  retire  from  the  position  assigned  to  it  after 
firing  a  half  dozen  rounds,  but  it  did  terrible  execution  while  there. 
The  6th  and  26th  Ohio  did  noble  service,  as  did  the  97th,  but  their  own 
immediate  commanders  will  no  doubt  allude  to  them  more  particu 
larly.  Thus  ended  the  third  assault  upon  our  position.  I  should 
have  remarked  that  the  100th  Illinois,  the  other  regiment  composing 
my  brigade,  which  was  in  reserve  during  the  first  engagement  de 
scribed  above,  had,  under  instruction  of  Col.  Hazen,  moved  to  the 
front  on  the  left  of  the  railroad,  and  taken  up  a  position  at  right 
angles  with  the  railroad,  where  they  fought  splendidly  in  all  the 
actions  that  took  place  on  the  left  of  the  road.  There  was  no  for 
midable  attack  made  upon  them,  though  they  were  almost  constantly 
under  fire  of  greater  or  less  severity,  particularly  from  shot  and  shell, 
and  suffered  quite  severely  in  killed  and  wounded.  Lieut.  Morrison 
Worthington,  of  that  regiment,  was  killed  while  gallantly  sustaining 
his  men,  and  six  other  commissioned  officers,  including  Major  Ham 
mond,  were  wounded.  Their  operations  being  to  the  left  of  the  rail 
road,  in  a  wood,  did  not  come  so  immediately  under  my  personal 
observation,  but  their  conduct,  from  Col.  Bartleson  down,  was  such 
as  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  The  58th  Indiana  having  now  been 
over  three  hours  in  action,  and  the  26th  Ohio  about  four  hours,  were 
exhausted  and  very  near  out  of  ammunition.  I  therefore  relieved 
the  58th  Indiana  with  the  40th  Indiana  from  Col.  Wagner's  brigade, 
and  the  26th  Ohio  was  relieved  by  the  23d  Kentucky.  There  was 
now  not  more  than  an  hour  of  the  day  left,  and  though  the  enemy 
was  constantly  maneuvering  in  our  front,  no  formidable  attack  was 
made  upon  us,  except  with  artillery.  The  enemy  having  been  three 
several  times  repulsed  in  their  attack  on  that  position,  seemed  satis 
fied  to  keep  at  a  respectful  distance,  and  the  sun  set  upon  us,  masters  of 


17 

the  situation.  We  had  sustained  ourselves  and  held  the  only  portion 
of  the  original  line  of  battle  that  was  held  throughout  by  any  portion  of 
our  army.  To  have  lost  this  position  would  have  been  to  lose  every 
thing,  as  our  left  would  then  have  been  turned  also,  and  utter  rout 
or  capture  inevitable. 

During  the  evening  of  the  31st,  I  was  officially  notified  that  in 
consequence  of  the  indisposition  of  Gen.  Wood,  and  a  wound  re 
ceived  by  him  during  the  forenoon  of  that  day,  he  was  relieved  of 
the  command  of  the  division,  and  that  the  same  would  devolve  upon 
myself.  I  therefore  turned  over  the  command  of  the  brigade  to  Col. 
Geo.  P.  Buell,  of  the  58th  Indiana,  and  assumed  command  of  the 
division.  All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted. 

MILO  S.  HASCALL,  Brig.  Gen.  Vols.,  Corn's  Brigade. 

ED.  R.  KERSTETTER,  Capt.  &  A.  A.  G.  (Official.) 


After  the  battle  was  over,  during  the  evening,  Colonel 
Harker\s  brigade  that  had  gone  to  the  assistance  of  the  right, 
returned  to  where  we  had  been  in  action  during  the  day,  and 
thus  the  division  was  once  more  together,  and  <fn  this  groumd 
we  did  the  best  we  could  towards  getting  something  to  eat, 
and  prepared  to  bivouac  on  the  same  ground  for  the  night. 
About  eleven  o'clock  that  night,  I  was  visited  by  Capt.  John 
Mendenhall,  Chief  of  Artillery  on  Gen.  Crittenden's  staff,  and 
who  belonged  to  the  Regular  Army  of  the  United  States,  and 
a  gentleman  of  tirst-class  intelligence,  and  purity  of  charac 
ter,  and  informed  that  since  the  cessation  of  hostilities  for  the 
night,  a  council  of  war  had  been  held  at  Gen.  Rosecrans' 
headquarters,  by  himself  and  his  Grand  Division  Commanders, 
and  that  a  general  retreat  to  Nashville  had  been  decided  upon, 
and  that  all  except  Gen.  Crittenden  concurred  in  the  advisa 
bility  of  such  movement,  and  he  was  overruled  by  the  others, 
and  that  in  pursuance  of  such  determination,  I  was  forthwith 
to  send  all  the  transportation  of  my  division,  except  one  wagon 
for  each  brigade,  to  the  rear,  and  when  the  transportation  was 
all  under  way,  this  was  to  be  followed  by  a  general  retreat  of 
our  army  to  Nashville.  Mendenhall  said  that  Crittenden  was 
very  much  incensed  at  the  proposition  for  retreat;  said  his 
army  was  in  position  and  on  hand,  and  that  if  he  were  over 
ruled  and  if  a  retreat  was  decided  upon,  that  he  would  cross 


18 

the  river  and  retreat  by  way  of  Gallatin  to  Nashville.  How 
ever,  the  retreat  was  decided  upon,  and  the  baggage  had  been 
sent  to  the  rear  as  above  directed,  and  we  were  laying  on  our 
arms  awaiting  the  further  order  to  retreat,  when  a  very  singu 
lar  circumstance  caused  Rosecrans  to  change  his  mind,  and 
conclude  to  fight  it  out  where  we  were.  A  large  number  of 
our  straggling,  demoralized  detachments  in  the  rear  of  our 
army,  being  hungry  and  thirsty,  had  concluded  to  disobey 
orders,  and  make  fire  and  try  and  get  something  to  eat.  One 
party  would  make  a  fire,  another  would  go  there  to  get  a  fire 
brand  to  start  another,  and  when  this  became  general  along 
our  rear,  Rosecrans  concluded  the  enemy  had  got  in  our  rear, 
and  were  forming  line  of  battle  by  torch  lights,  and  hence 
withdrew  the  order  for  a  general  retreat.  After  this,  about 
one  o'clock,  I  was  informed  also  by  Capt.  Mendenhall,  that 
the  retreat  had  been  given  up,  and  that  I  was  ordered  to  fall 
back  with  my  division  about  half  a  mile,  and  take  up  a  posi 
tion  that  would  there  be  assigned  me.  Accordingly  I  did  so, 
and  in  the  morning  found  myself  occupying  a  position  with 
no  advantages  for  offensive  or  defensive  operations,  and  very 
much  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire,  with  no  chance  for  return 
ing  it  with  any  effect.  The  enemy  wrere  occupying  the  position 
I  had  fallen  back  from,  and  at  that  point  concentrated  a  large 
number  of  pieces  of  artillery,  with  which,  about  nine  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  they  opened  upon  us  a  tremendous  artillery 
fire,  under  the  cover  of  which  I  supposed  their  infantry  would 
charge  upon  us,  but  for  some  strange  reason  or  other,  they 
did  not  do  so.  Desultory  firing  afterwards,  was  kept  up  dur 
ing  the  day,  until  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  In 
the  meantime  we  had  sent  a  division  across  the  river  to  the 
left,  which  was  occupying  the  high  ground  near  where  the 
enemy's  right  was  resting  originally.  About  three  o'clock 
Breckenridge's  troops,  of  the  rebel  army,  fell  furiously  upon 
this  division,  and  drove  them  rapidly  from  their  position,  on 
account  of  their  superior  numbers.  At  this  juncture  Critten- 
den  ordered  Mendenhall  to  concentrate  his  artillery  on  the 
bank  of  the  river  to  our  front  and  left,  which  he  promptly 
did,  and  ordered  me,  with  my  division,  to  promptly  cross  the 


19 

river  in  support  of  the  division  already  there  in  retreat.  Upon 
our  arrival  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  the  furious  tire  from 
Mendenhall's  artillery  had  checked  the  rebel  advance,  and  the 
division  over  there  turned  upon  their  assailants,  and  with  the 
assistance  of  my  division,  drove  Breckenridge  back  to  the 
position  he  had  occupied  before  making  the  assault.  The  latter 
part  of  these  operations  were  carried  on  in  the  darkness,  and 
we  slept  upon  our  arms,  amidst  the  dead  and  wounded.  It 
had  been  raining  hard  all  the  night,  and  the  river  was  rising 
very  rapidly,  so  much  so  that  if  we  had  remained  there  until 
morning,  there  would  have  been  danger  that  the  river  would 
become  impassable,  and  the  divisions  been  left  there  by  them 
selves  in  the  presence  of  the  Avhole  rebel  army.  Accordingly, 
about  two  o'clock  at  night,  we  were  ordered  to  recross  the 
river,  and  take  up  positions  where  we  had  been  during  the 
previous  day.  We  arrived  back  there  between  that  time  and 
morning,  thoroughly  wet  through,  and  completely  jaded  out, 
having  had  no  sleep,  and  but  little  to  eat  during  the  previous 
forty-eight  hours.  Both  armies  continued  after  this  during 
the  third  day,  to  occupy  the  positions  they  had  on  that  morn 
ing.  It  was  cold,  wet,  and  very  disagreeable  weather;  both 
armies  were  completely  tired  out,  and  seemed  content  to 
do  nothing  more  than  to  engage  in  some  desultory  firing,  and 
watch  each  other  closely.  On  the  morning  of  the  fourth  day, 
January  3,  or  rather,  during  the  forenoon  of  that  day,  the 
stragglers  from  the  right,  during  the  first  day's  battle,  who 
had  not  stopped  in  their  flight  until  they  reached  Nashville, 
began  to  return  in  large  numbers,  in  companies,  and  even 
regiments,  and  Bragg,  observing  this,  concluded  we  were  re 
ceiving  large  bodies  of  reinforcements  from  the  north,  and 
therefore  concluded  to  fall  back  and  give  up  the  contest.  He 
accordingly  did  so,  and  on  the  fourth  day,  January  4,  he  took 
possession  of  Murfreesboro  without  the  firing  of  a  gun.  Thus 
ended  the  great  battle  of  Stone  River.  We  had  not  made  a 
single  attack  during  the  whole  time ;  were  badly  beaten 
and  well  nigh  driven  from  the  field  the  first  day,  and  only 
saved  from  an  ignominious  retreat  upon  Nashville  by  the  ri 
diculous  misconception  on  the  part  of  Rosecrans,  already 


20 

alluded  to  on  the  first  night  after  the  battle  commenced.  As 
it  was,  we  lost  all  oar  transportation,  by  sending  it  to  the  rear, 
that  night,  preparatory  for  the  retreat,  the  whole  having  been 
burned  by  the  rebels  at  Lavergne,  notwithstanding  we  were 
supposed  to  have  some  cavalry  in  our  rear,  under  (jen.  Stan 
ley.  Where  it  was  at  the  time  our  transportation  was  being 
burned  by  the  rebel  cavalry,  I  have  never  heard. 

Finally  our  fugitives  from  the  first  day's  battle  began  to 
return,  thereupon  Bragg  became  very  much  frightened  and 
beat  a  retreat,  and  we  thus  gained  Murfreesboro.  After  this 
reports  were  written  up  to  praise  the  men  it  had  been  deter 
mined  upon  in  advance  to  promote,  and  these  identical  men 
that  I  had  predicted  would  be  favored,  were  promoted  ;  one 
of  them,  St.  Claire  Morton,  from  Captain  to  Brigadier-General, 
while  others,  upon  whom  rested  the  heat  and  burden  of  the 
day,  and  who  saved  the  army  from  utter  annihilation,  were 
not  only  not  promoted,  but  in  many  instances  not  even  men 
tioned.  It  was,  for  instance,  Sheridan's  fate  to  be  early  driven 
from  the  field,  whether  from  his  fault  or  not,  it  is  not  neces 
sary  to  inquire.  Enough  for  this  occasion  that  it  was  so,  and 
the  facts  of  his  subsequent  career  no  more  justify  what  was 
done  for  him  on  this  occasion,  than  would  the  subsequent 
illustrious  career  of  Gen.  Grant  justify  his  promotion  for  the 
terrible  blunders  committed  by  him  concerning  the  most  un 
fortunate  battle  of  Shiloh. 

In  what  I  have  said  in  this  paper  in  regard  to  the  Cath 
olic  Church,  I  do  not  wish  to  be  understood  as  having  any 
desire  to  say  anything  against  that  church,  but  simply  to 
condemn  the  idea  of  making  membership  in  that,  or  any  other 
particular  church,  a  necessary  concomitant  to  advancement, 
either  in  a  military  or  civil  capacity,  under  our  government. 
Farther,  in  all  that  I  have  said  nothing  has  been  said  in  malice 
towards  any  officer  or  person,  but  simply  that  that  criticism 
so  necessary  to  the  establishment  of  right  and  justice  in  regard 
to  the  late  war  may  be  freely  indulged  in,  whether  it  affect 
the  highest  officer,  or  the  lowest  private  that  offered  his  life  in 
defense  of  his  country.  It  will  be  seen  that  my  estimate  of 


21 

the  fitness  of  Gen.  Rosecrans  to  command  an  army  was  not 
enhanced  by  his  career  during  and  preceding  the  battle  of 
Stone  River.  When  disaster  came  to  the  right,  he  should 
have  given  his  attention  personally  to  that,  and  lent  the  magic 
of  his  personal  presence  to  rallying  the  fleeing  troops  from 
that  division,  in  place  of  going  to  the  extreme  left  himself — in 
stead  of  by  a  staff  officer — for  ordering  the  movement  of  troops 
in  that  direction.  When  the  whole  affair  was  over,  and  quiet 
restored,  I  made  an  application  to  be  transferred  to  another 
army  on  account  of  want  of  confidence  in  him  as  the  com 
mander  of  an  army  in  the  field.  This  I  supposed  would  cause 
my  arrest,  and  give  an  opportunity  for  me  to  demonstrate  the 
great  cause  that  existed  for  my  apprehensions,  but  instead  of 
doing  this,  he  returned  my  application  endorsed  that  he  could 
not  spare  the  services  of  so  useful  an  officer  as  myself,  and 
that  there  would  be  no  forward  movement  of  the  army  for  six 
months,  and  detailed  me  to  proceed  to  Indianapolis,  Ind.,  to 
superintend  the  work  of  returning  deserters  from  Ohio,  Indi 
ana,  and  Illinois.  Just  before  my  leaving  Murfreesboro  for 
Indianapolis  we  saw  Bragg's  telegraphic  account  to  Richmond, 
of  the  first  day's  proceedings.  It  was  as  follows  :  ;'This 
morning,  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  we  attacked  the  enemy 
on  his  extreme  right,  and  have  routed  him  from  every  portion 
of  his  line  except  upon  his  extreme  left,  where  he  has  suc 
cessfully  resisted  us."  As  I  left  there  was  a  proposition 
started  in  Crittenden's  command  to  raise  money  to  present 
Bragg  a  sword  for  making  the  above  truthful  statement 
of  the  first  days  operations.  While  at  Indianapolis,  I  was, 
at  the  request  of  Gen.  Burnside,  transferred  by  the  War  De 
partment,  to  the  army  of  the  Ohio  and  given  the  command 
of  a  division  in  that  army.  The  next  that  we  heard  of  Gen. 
Rosecrans  was  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  that  was  the 
last  we  heard  of  him  in  a  military  way,  and  all  can  now  see 
how  much  cause  there  was  for  the  apprehensions  I  entertained. 
This  was  not  the  first  instance  that  great  unfitness  achieved 
high  rank  in  our  armies  and  it  was  quite  common  for  great 
merit  to  be  entirely  unrewarded,  and  indeed  entirely  unknown. 
But  time  is  a  great  healer,  and  let  us  hope  that  honest  merit 


22 

will  in  the  end  get  its  recognition,  trusting  in  the  truthfulness 
of  the  idea  that 

"  Ever  the  world  goes  round  and  round, 
And  ever  the  truth  comes  uppermost, 
And  justic^  shall  be  done." 


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